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The consequences for human welfare involved in questions like
these are simply staggering: Once one starts to think about them,
it is hard to think about anything else.
(Lucas 1988, p. 5; italics in original, emphasis in bold ours).1. Introduction
Much of the focus in the academic and policy literature on “growth”
has been on a steady-state or a long-run average rate of growth of out-
put per capita, or equivalently, comparing levels of income. But the focus
on one single growth rate for a particular country misses the point that
most countries observe dramatic ﬂuctuations in growth of per capita in-
come. Following Pritchett (2000), it has been increasingly recognized
that that developing country output growth is not well described by a
“steady-state” growth rate but rather is an “episodic” phenomena
with countries undertaking discrete shifts from periods of low growthferee and the editor. We also
ates and Inclusive Development
l disclaimer applies.
. This is an open access article under(growth decelerations) to periods of high growth (growth accelera-
tions) and vice versa (Pritchett, 2000) or “boom and bust” growth
(Easterly et al., 1993; Ben-David and Papell, 1998; Jones and Olken,
2008). In this paper, we provide a method of quantifying the amount
of income gain and loss during growth accelerations and growth decel-
erations, and show that the income gains and losses are staggering in
magnitude, often multiples of the level of income at the start of the
growth episode. Further, we show that many developing countries
have gone through episodes of large income gains followed by episodes
of large income losses (and vice versa) in the post-World War II period.
For these countries, in particular, focusing on a single growth rate has no
sensible economic meaning, as these gains and losses in incomes have
been borne by different generation of citizens of that country.
An increasingly large literature in the empirics of growth has under-
stood the shortcomings of the ‘steady-state’ based approach and viewed
economic growth as an ‘episodic phenomena’. Much of this literature
has focused on the timing of the structural breaks in economic growth
and the magnitude of growth rate differences before and after the
onset of an episode—and their correlates. Some of these papers focus on
accelerations/takeoffs (Hausmann et al., 2005, Aizenman and Spiegel,
2010), others on decelerations/depressions (Rodrik, 1999; Hausmann
et al., 2006, Arbache and Page, 2007; Breuer and McDermott, 2013). A
more recent literature has focused on the duration of growth episodes
and its correlates (Berg et al., 2012; Bluhm et al., 2014) However, none
of these studies provide estimates of ‘magnitudes’ of the impact of growth
during episodes of accelerations and decelerations—the cumulativethe CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1 Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012 and North et al., 2009 both argue for the importance of
institutions (“inclusive” for AR and “open access orders” for NWW) in determining levels
of national output adding to the econometrics of “institutions rule” (Rodrik et al., 2004;
Easterly and Levine, 2003). Comin et al. (2010) take this to the extreme of showing that
patterns of technological adoption in 1000 BC affect levels of the GDP per capita today.
Chaudhry and Ikram (2015) ﬁnd that genetic proximity increase growth spillovers and
Nawaz (2015) ﬁnd that institutions matter for growth particularly for developing
countries.
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both growth rate differences before and after the start of an episode
and the duration of the episode. Without such estimates, it is difﬁcult
to assess the magnitude of income gains and losses during growth
episodes.
In this paper, we make two main contributions to the literature on
economic growth. Firstly, we provide a measure of success (or failure)
of growth episodes. We do this by proposing a new technique for
measuring the total magnitude of the impact of a growth episode,
which we call “episode-magnitude”: the change in output per capita
resulting from one structural break in the trend growth of output
(acceleration or deceleration) to the next. The magnitude of the
gain or loss from a growth episode is the difference in per capita
income at the end of the episode as compared to what it should
have been if per capita income had grown at a counter-factual “no
break” rate. Our calculation of the magnitude of income gain or loss
during a growth episode combines the difference between the
post-break growth rate versus a counter-factual “no break” growth
rate and the duration of the episode.
To obtain the estimates of the magnitude of growth during an
episode, we need an estimate of the “counter-factual” growth rate—that
is, the growth rate that we would have expected to prevail in the econ-
omy in the absence of the episode. For each growth episodewe propose
and implement three counter-factuals: i.e., (a) the growth rate in the
previous episode reﬂecting the idea of “no regression to mean”,
(b) the world average growth rate during the episode reﬂecting the
idea of “complete regression to mean” and (c) a predicted growth rate
based on the idea of “partial regression tomean”. The “partial regression
to mean” growth rate uses a regression for each country/episode to
allow “predicted” growth to depend on a country's initial GDP per
capita, the episode period speciﬁc to world average growth and a ﬂexi-
bly speciﬁed regression to the mean. The second and third counter-
factual growth rate captures a feature of cross-national growth rates
that has been highlighted by Easterly et al. (1993) and Pritchett and
Summers (2014)—that there is strong regression to mean in growth
rates of GDP per capita, with very little persistence in country growth
rates over time. The deﬁnition of the magnitude of growth episodes
allows us to decompose the total change in GDP per capita into the
sum of the magnitude of the positive and negative contributions of
each episode.
The second contributionwemake to the literature on the empirics of
growth is that we propose both a ﬂow and a stockmeasure of themag-
nitude of a growth episode, which allows us to show how large income
gains and losses are in any particular growth episode. By providing
these measures, we provide a quantitative context for policy reforms,
and an assessment of the nature of income gain or loss we may expect
with the onset of a growth episode in developing countries. The ﬂow
measure is the difference between the level of output at the end of the
episode and the counter-factual of what the level of output would
have been in the absence of the onset of the growth episode. The
stock measure computes the total net present value of the difference
between the actual trajectory of output during the episode and the
predicted trajectory. These deﬁnitions of magnitude combine in an
intuitive way the change in the growth rate due to the episode and
the duration of the episode. An acceleration to a modest growth rate
which is sustained over decades will have a larger magnitude than a
large but short-lived burst. Our method allows us to place dollar ﬁgures
on growth episodes. For example, the top 20 growth accelerations have
a net present value (NPV)magnitude of 30 trillion dollars—twice the US
GDP. The top 20 growth decelerations account for 35 trillion dollars less
in NPV of output.
The current consensus in growth economics, that stresses the impor-
tance of “institutions” in determining levels of national output per
capita, combinedwith the persistence of the long-run structural, histor-
ical and political factors that shape institutions, seems to pessimistically
suggest that there may be no feasible “what, exactly” that will changeeconomic outcomes.1 Yet, as we document here, there are cases in
which identiﬁable accelerations and decelerations of economic growth
cause spectacular gains and losses in output. Clearly, this shows that
there is space for optimism about what is possible, particularly in devel-
oping countries. In 1988when Lucaswrote his piece,many thought that
the “nature of India” condemned it to a modest “Hindu rate of growth.”
But, according to our estimates, GDP per capita growth in India acceler-
ated in 1993 to 4.23 percent per annum (ppa) versus a predicted rate
of 2.34 ppa and then accelerated again in 2002 to 6.29 ppa versus a
predicted rate of 2.91 ppa. The net present value (at a 5% discount
rate) of the additional output from the 2002 growth acceleration was
2.65 trillion dollars (PPP) adding to the 1.05 trillion dollar net present
value (NPV) of output gain from the 1993 acceleration for a total
NPV gain from growth accelerations in 1993 of 3.7 trillion dollars. Con-
versely, Brazil's was a “miracle” country from 1967 to 1980 growing at
5.16 ppa. But growth decelerated sharply in 1980 to essentially zero
and stayed low until 2002. We estimate the NPV of the lost output
from this slowing of growth relative to its prediction to be 7.3 trillion
dollars.
Changes in standards of living are measured by income per capita in
a particular year.We can also convert our NPV calculations into ametric
that gives the average annualized gain or loss in per capita income over
each episode. We ﬁnd examples of large increases in annualized
per capita income in NPV, as well as of large decreases. For example,
Taiwan's growth acceleration episode which began in 1962 led to an
astounding increase of 2300 NPV dollars per person (in constant US
PPP terms) per year for 32 years. In contrast, Iran's growth deceleration
episode which began in 1976 led to a remarkable decrease in NPV in-
come per capita per year of 12,220 dollars for 12 years. We document
30 cases of NPV gains from growth accelerations that are more than
triple initial GDP per capita and 32 cases where the NPV of losses from
decelerations exceeded three times the initial GDP per capita. These
changes in growth are much harder to explain as pre-determined – by
history or institutions or otherwise – as often quite similarly situated
countries launch into new paths, different from their own history and
from their neighbors.
In this paper, we do not provide a causal explanation of the growth
episodes we document, nor what explains the size of these episodes in
terms of income gains and losses. By documenting the magnitude of
gains and losses, we set the stage for examining “what, exactly” can be
done, which remain themost consequential research question in devel-
opment economics.
The rest of the paper is in four sections. In Section 2, we ﬁrst outline
the procedure we use to identify structural breaks in growth rates. We
then describe our proposed method of estimating the ‘ﬂow’ and ‘stock’
magnitudes of growth episodes, and provide examples of the method,
as applied to selected countries. In Section 3, we show how our method
allows us to decompose country growth experiences in a different way
than is usually done in the literature using average growth rates.
Section 4 discusses the estimates of greatest NPV gains and losses, as
measured by the “partial regression to the mean” counter-factual.
Section 5 concludes.
2. Identifying growth episodes and estimating episode magnitudes
An episode-based analysis of growth is different from the Barro-type
growth regressions or other standard regressions of long run growth in
2 From the PWT7.1 data, Kar et al. (2013) eliminated all countries that had very small
populations (less than 700,000 in 1980) and those that did not have data since 1970
(which eliminated many former Soviet sphere countries and some oil rich countries like
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia).
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over which growth is measured is decided in an ad hoc manner (say a
decade) while episode-based approaches have to precisely deﬁne how
to identify the length of an episode. The second difference is that
while average growth rates are a suitable measure of the impact of
growth in the standard regressions, they are not so in episode-based
approaches, as the duration of episodes (which vary widely) is as im-
portant as the growth rate in this approach. In this section, we describe
previous work that suggests a procedure to identify growth episodes
(Kar et al., 2013) and introduce our method for calculating the magni-
tude of growth during an episode—the ‘episode-magnitude’.
2.1. Identifying growth episodes
Moving away from explaining long-run growth averages to
explaining transitions between growth regimes necessitates the knowl-
edge of the timing of the breaks in economic growth. Following Pritchett
(2000), a set of recent studies attempted to identify breaks in growth
rates of GDP per capita for countries with comparable income data.
Two distinct approaches have been developed by this literature. The
ﬁrst is a ‘ﬁlter-based’ approach that identiﬁes growth breaks on the
basis of subjectively deﬁned rules. Using this approach, Hausmann
et al. (2005) study breaks that involve growth accelerations, Hausmann
et al. (2006) study growth collapses and Aizenman and Spiegel (2010)
study takeoffs—periods of sustained high growth following periods of
stagnation. The second approach is based on statistical structural break
tests that uses estimation and testing procedures to identify growth
breaks in terms of statistically signiﬁcant changes in (average) growth
rates. The studies that have adopted the ‘statistical’ approach have used
the Bai–Perron (1998) (BP) methodology which locates and tests for
multiple growth breaks within a time-series framework (Jones and
Olken, 2008).
Both approaches have serious shortcomings that call for a better
alternative. The limitation of the ﬁlter-based approach is well known—
the use of ﬁlters pre-determined by the researcher is ad hoc, and leads
to a lack of consistency in the identiﬁcation of breaks across papers
that use the ﬁlter-based approach. On the other hand, a signiﬁcant
shortcoming with the statistical approach is that it is limited by the
low power of the Bai–Perron test, which leads to the rejection of true
breaks which are suggested by the behavior of the underlying GDP per
capita series (Berg et al., 2012).
Kar et al. (2013) propose an approach that provides a uniﬁed
framework for identifying breaks in economic growth drawing
from ﬁlter-based and statistical approaches. They use a procedure
for identifying structural breaks in economic growth that uses
the Bai–Perron procedure of maximizing the F-statistic to identify
candidate years for structural breaks in growth with thresholds on
the magnitude of the shift to determine which are actual breaks
(see Kar et al., 2013). This procedure involves the best ﬁt of the BP
method to the data in the ﬁrst stage, and the application of a ﬁlter
to the breaks identiﬁed in the ﬁrst stage in the second stage. The
magnitude ﬁlter was that the absolute value of the change in the
growth rate after a BP potential break had to be (a) 2 percentage
points if it was the ﬁrst break, (b) 3 percentage points if the potential
break was of the opposite sign of the previous break (an acceleration
that followed a deceleration had to have accelerated growth by more
than 3 ppa to qualify as a break) and (c) 1 percentage point if the BP
potential break was of the same sign as the previous break, so if the
BP identiﬁed an acceleration that directly followed an acceleration
(or deceleration that followed a previous deceleration) the magnitude
had to be larger than 1 percentage point to qualify as a break. To esti-
mate potential breaks, they assumed that a “growth regime” lasts a
minimum of 8 years (as in Berg et al., 2012). The use of shorter periods
(e.g. 3 or 5 years) risk conﬂation with “business cycle ﬂuctuations” or
truly “short run” shocks (e.g. droughts). Longer periods (e.g. 10 or
12 years) reduce the number of potential breaks. Application of thisprocedure to the PWT7.1 data for 125 countries2 for 1950–2010
identiﬁes 314 structural breaks in growth, with some countries having
no breaks (e.g. USA, France, Australia) and others having four breaks
(e.g. Argentina, Zambia). Appendix A in Kar et al. (2013) provides a
list of all 314 breaks identiﬁed by country and year of break.
2.2. Estimating the episode-magnitude of growth accelerations and
decelerations
We deﬁne the episode-magnitude as the magnitude of the gain (or
loss) in per capita income by the end of the episode, as a result of the
growth in the episode. Equivalently, it is the product of (i) the additional
growth during the episode and (ii) the duration of the episode. The
additional growth during the episode is the difference between the ac-
tual growth rate during the episode, and a predicted counter-factual
growth rate of the economy, had it not transitioned to this particular
episode.
How do we predict this counter-factual growth rate? One simple
(although naive) prediction is that the growth rate would be what it
was in the last episode (no change). This prediction however, ignores
a very robust ‘stylized fact’ about medium term growth rates, i.e., the
tendency of these growth rates to ‘regress to the mean’. Like other
volatile variables like returns on ﬁnancial investments, medium term
growth rates have been shown to have very low persistence, and
hence for example, high growth in the current period increases the pos-
sibility of lower growth in the future (Easterly et al., 1993; Pritchett
and Summers, 2014). In terms of growth episodes, this implies that a
predicted counter-factual growth rate can do much better than a “no
change” assumption, by adopting some version of regression to mean.
There is another important reason why regression to mean needs to
be incorporated in a deﬁnition of episode-magnitude. It should be noted
that if there is a tendency of growth rates to regress to themean, then it
is a statistical phenomenon exhibited by many other variables. It is not
causal in the sense that the reversal of growth rates in any episode
for any particular country due to this tendency, is not attributable to
changes in the determinants of growth during that episode. Since our
interest in deﬁning an episode-magnitude is to subsequently relate it
to the underlying determinants of growth, our deﬁnition of this variable
needs to remove the part that is due to this statistical phenomenon,
leaving only that part of the variation in the growth outcome that can
be explained by underlying factors. This implies that the measure of
the success (or failure) of a growth episode has to be “over and above”
its tendency to regress to the mean.
Based on these considerations, we propose three predicted “counter-
factual” growth rates, i.e., (a) the growth rate in the previous episode
reﬂecting the idea of “no regression to mean”, (b) the world average
growth rate during the episode reﬂecting the idea of “complete regres-
sion to mean” and (c) a predicted growth rate based on the idea of
“partial regression to mean”. The “partial regression to mean” growth
rate uses a regression for each country/episode to allow “predicted”
growth to depend on a country's initial GDP per capita, the episode
period speciﬁc world average growth and a ﬂexibly speciﬁed regression
to the mean.
Suppose we have a structural break in growth in year t that ends a
previous growth episode. Also suppose that the growth in the previous
episodewas gbefore that lasted for Nb years and the growth in the current
episode is gep and this episode lasts Nep years. We deﬁne the episode-
magnitude of the current growth episode (where F denotes the
episode) as the difference in logs between its actual GDP per capita
Fig. 1. Episode-magnitude based on three alternative counter-factuals. Note: gPRM is the
“partial regression to the mean” growth rate, and gWA is the “complete regression to
the mean” or the world average growth rate; gep is the actual growth rate during the
episode, and gbefore is the pre-break growth rate; EMFNo Change, EMFWA ,and EMFPRM are the
episode magnitudes when the counter-factual growth rates are gbefore, gWA and gPRM
respectively; Nepis the duration of the current episode and Nb is the duration of the
previous episode; y is the per capita income (in logs), and the break in growth occurs at
time t.
Source: our illustration.
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GDPPC is y then the equation is:
Episode magnitudeF ¼ yActualtþNep−yCounter factualtþNep ð1Þ
By deﬁnition, the right hand side of Eq. (1) is nothing but the product
of the actual growth rate during the episode (relative to the counterfactu-
al) and the duration of the episode. This deﬁnition of episode-magnitude
thus fulﬁls our criteria for a measure of the impact of a growth episode.
Let us now formalize each of the three counter-factuals discussed above.
“No regression tomean”: This assumes that there is zero regression to
themean and the counter-factual for growthduring the episodewas the
pre-break growth rate.3 In this case themagnitude of the total gain/loss
from the episode is:
Episode magnitudeNo ChangeF ¼ gep−gbefore
 
 Nep ð2Þ
“Complete regression to mean” (CRM): Complete regression to the
mean assumes that the growth rate during the episode would have
been the world average growth during the same period.4
Episode magnitudeCRMF ¼ gep−gworld averaget;tþNep
 
 Nep ð3Þ
“Partial regression to mean” (PRM): In this case, the counter-factual
growth during the episode is predicted from past growth. This
counter-factual growth, denoted by gPRM, is the prediction from a
country/episode speciﬁc regression of growth for all countries j other
than the countrywith the break on a constant plus initial GDP per capita
plus previous growth. We use a spline to allow the coefﬁcient on previ-
ous growth to be differentwhether the country's growth rate before the
episode was higher or lower than the world average.
g jPRM ¼ αepj þ βepbelow  cj  g jbefore−gworld averagebefore
 
þ βepabove  d
j
 g jbefore−gworld averagebefore
 
þ γ  yjt þ ε j
ð4Þ
This functional form for the counter-factual growth allows for four
things: (1) the constant αep allows the world average growth rate
to vary over time and be speciﬁc to the period of the episode to accom-
modate a global “business cycle”; (2) regression to the mean is period
speciﬁc; (3) regression to the mean depends on previous growth (as
recoveries from negative/slow growth make have different dynamics
that the slowing of accelerations), with the persistence coefﬁcients,
βbelowep and βaboveep capturing regression to the mean, if previous growth
was below and above the previous world average growth rate respec-
tively (with cj=1 and dj=1 if the previous growth rate of the country
in question was lower and higher than the previous world average
growth rate respectively, 0 otherwise); and (4) growth to depend on
the initial level of income, given by the coefﬁcient γ (without condition-
ing variables this is not estimating “conditional convergence”).5 The
error term of the regression is given by εj.
The episode-magnitude of a growth episode, using the “partial re-
gression to mean” as the counter-factual growth rate, is given by:
EpisodemagnitudePRMF ¼ gep−gPRM
 
 Nep ð5Þ
Fig. 1 illustrates the estimates of the growthmagnitude for the three
counter-factuals for the case of acceleration from low growth to high3 The ‘no change’ growth rate is the coefﬁcient from an OLS regression of ln(GDPPC) on
a time trend over the pre-break period.
4 The world average growth rate is the average of the growth rates of all countries
minus the country in question for the period of the growth episode.
5 For the period from the beginning of the data to the ﬁrst growth break, the PRM is just
a regression of growth on the natural log level of initial output.growth. In this (hypothetical) case, the “no regression to mean”
counter-factual implies a very large magnitude, and the “complete
regression tomean” (world average) counter-factual a small magnitude
(as the post-acceleration growth is not much higher than the world
average). The “partial regression to mean” counter-factual will essen-
tially be a regression determined weighted average of the two and
hence will tend to be in between the two extremes. When using the
“complete regression to mean” or the “partial regression to mean”
counter-factual, a growth acceleration could have a negativemagnitude
(or a growth deceleration a positive magnitude).
Our preferred speciﬁcation uses the PRM counter-factual. Zero
regression to the mean (No Change) or complete regression to the
mean, while easy to understand, impose strong and empirically unsup-
ported assumptions about the actual dynamics of growthwhich is char-
acterized by strong but not complete regression to the mean (Pritchett
and Summers, 2014).
Table 1 summarizes the regressions for calculating the PRM growth
rate based on Eq. (4) (the estimates of episode magnitude for the 314
episodes using the three counter-factuals are in Online Appendix A1
and the regressions results for the PRM counter-factual for each episode
are inOnline Appendix Table A2). The spline shows strong, andmodestly
asymmetric, regression to themean. Countrieswith belowworldmedian
growth showalmost no persistence – the average coefﬁcient on previous
growth is only 0.171 –while thosewith above average growth tended to
have more persistence—but still show strong regression to the mean.
Since each country/episode regression is for different periods of “before”
and “after” we adjust to a “standard” of the persistence coefﬁcient for
an episode 10 years in duration, starting after an episode of 10 years
duration in 1980. We see that the asymmetry is, if anything, stronger
with very near zero persistence of slow growth (0.125) and substantial
(but far from full) persistence of 0.388 for rapid growth.2.3. Estimating the ‘stock’ magnitude of growth accelerations/decelerations
Once the ﬂow magnitude of a growth episode (acceleration or
deceleration) is deﬁned as above it is easy to deﬁne the stock or net
present value (NPV) magnitude of the episode. The “stock” estimate of
the total gain, discounted to the beginning of the episode, is simply
the sum of the discounted differences in annual output from the begin-
ning to the end of the episode (Eq. (6)). This NPV of additional GDP is
expressed in the same units as GDP and hence in this instance in con-
stant units of purchasing power. The counter-factual output series can
Table 2
NPV of the total magnitude of the loss in output during the Brazilian growth episode,
1980–2002, billions of dollars.
Source: authors' calculations.
Discount
rate
Counter-factual growth series (actual growth =−0.05)
Partial regression
to mean (g= 4.02)
Complete regression
to mean (g= 1.30)
No Change
(g= 5.16)
0.05 −7547 −2107 −10,459
0.03 −10,062 −2786 −13,991
0.10 −3937 −1122 −5408
Note: g is the counter-factual growth rate. Growth rates are in per cent per annum terms.
Table 3
Summary statistics of episode magnitude estimates (in units of natural log of GDP per
capita).
Source: our estimates.
Counter-factual used All Only
accelerations
Only
decelerations
314 153 161
Table 1
Summary of the 314 country/episode speciﬁc regressions used to compute “partial regression to the mean” growth rates.
Source: based on regressions reported in Online Appendix Table A2.
Regression constant
(αep)
Coefﬁcient on level of ln(GDPPC)
at beginning of episode (γ)
Persistence coefﬁcient
(Previous growth below world median)
(βbelowep )
(Previous growth above world median)
(βaboveep )
Average 0.77 0.001 0.171 0.338
“Standardized” persistence (impact of past growth on predicted growth) of an episode
beginning in 1980, following an episode of 10 years and lasting 10 years
0.125 0.388
283L. Pritchett et al. / Economic Modelling 55 (2016) 279–291be calculated from the beginning to end of the growth episode with any
of the three counter-factual growth rates.
EpisodemagnitudeNC;CRM;PRMNPV ¼
Xn¼Nep
n¼1
δn
 
yActualtþ1 −y
Counter factual
tþ1
  
ð6Þ
where the discount factor is the standard δn = 1 / (1 + r)n, where r is
the discount rate.6
This calculation of the total (NPV) magnitude of growth episodes is
purely descriptive. We allow the data to say “something happened in
year t that changed the trend rate of growth of GDPPC that lasted for
N years.” We then calculate the total (NPV) of the difference in output
between what happened over those years relative to a counter-factual
series of output and this is the total (NPV) of the output that existed
(or did not exist) because of what happened in year t. This does not
prejudge what it was that happened in year t – a terms of trade
improvement, a shift in animal spirits, a policy shift, a shift in expecta-
tions due to a political regime shift, a transmission of a global shock,
technological innovation – to cause this growth shift.
2.4. An illustrative case of an estimate of the episode magnitude
We illustrate our method using Brazil as an example. Kar et al.
(2013) identify three structural breaks in the GDPPC series of Brazil:
(i) an acceleration in 1967 in which growth increased from 4.16
to 5.16 ppa, (ii) a deceleration in 1980 of 5.20 ppa from 5.16 to
−0.05 ppa, and (iii) an acceleration in 2002 of 3.20 ppa from −0.05
to 3.15 ppa. These acceleration and deceleration years create four
episodes of growth (1950–1967, 1967–1980, 1980–2002 and 2002–
2010). In the 1967–1980 growth episode, growthwas 5.16 ppawhereas
PRM growth was 2.87 ppa so the excess of the growth during this
episode was 2.29 ppa and the episode lasted for 13 years so the level
of GDPPC in 1980 due to the acceleration of 1967 is 0.30 log units
(that is, 030 = (0.0516–0.0287) * 13). In other words, the per capita
income in Brazil was 30% higher in 1980 than what the level of per
capita income would have been if per capita output had grown at the
PRM counter-factual rate. The deceleration in 1980 slowed growth to
−0.05 ppa whereas the PRM growth was 4.02 ppa. This implies that
the level of GDPPC in 2002 was lower by (−0.05 – 4.02) * 22 = 0.89
natural log units. Rather than 6885 dollars from the actual growth rate
at the PRMcounter-factual GDPPCwould have been 16,653 dollars—140%
higher.
The NPV calculations for the Brazilian 1980–2002 episode illustrate
the method and its variations (Table 2). Our “base case” is the
PRM counter-factual with a 5% discount rate. This gives a total loss of
7.5 trillion dollars. Intuitively, this loss is larger with a lower discount
rate: 10 trillion at 3% whereas it is only 3.9 trillion at 10%. As can be
seen from the ﬁgure the PRM growth rate is in between the “complete
regression tomean” growth rate of 1.3 ppa and the No Change6 Note that this is a “gross”, not “net” concept of NPV. For instance, if growth is higher
because the saving rate increases, we do not deduct the cost of the increase in savings in
assessing the NPV. This is therefore not (yet) directly comparable to NPVs as used in
cost–beneﬁt analysis of speciﬁc projects or policies.extrapolation of the previous period of 5.16 ppa. Obviously the loss (at
5%) using the complete regression tomean counter-factual is lower at
“only” 2.1 trillion and is much larger using the No Change counter-
factual, 10.46 trillion.
2.5. Basic summary statistics on growth episode magnitudes
Table 3 gives the summary statistics for each of the three counter-
factuals, by all growth episodes (314) and accelerations and decelera-
tions separately. The estimates of growth episodemagnitude are differ-
ences in natural log units of changes in GDP per capita of end of episode
actual versus the counter-factual growth rate. So an episodemagnitude
of 0.20 in log unit of GDP terms implies that the GDPPC is 20% higher at
the end of the episode as compared to the relevant counter-factual
growth rate.
This table illustrates the importance of allowing for regression to the
mean in the counter-factual Themedianmagnitudewith the No Change
counter-factual is 0.426 for accelerations and−0.439 for decelerations
as it presumes that, say, negative growth rates would stay negative
rather than revert to, say, the world average. Once we allow for regres-
sion to themean using either PRM or CRM (world average) the episode
magnitudes are much smaller, with the median for PRM being 0.206
and for CRM being 0.187 for accelerations and the median for PRM
being−0.245 and CRM being−0.205 for decelerations respectively.
The second point evident in Table 3 is the large variability in the
magnitude of growth episodes. Taking PRM estimates, the median is
0.206 with a standard deviation of 0.291 so the “large” episodes are
0.497 or larger, implying gains in GDPPC of about 2/3—larger than thePartial regression
to mean
Median −0.030 0.206 −0.245
Standard deviation 0.394 0.291 0.310
Complete regression
to mean
Median 0.000 0.187 −0.205
Standard deviation 0.380 0.310 0.332
No Change Median −0.062 0.426 −0.439
Standard deviation 0.709 0.486 0.390
7 The mean duration of a growth episode is 14.4 years, and the longest growth episode
(Turkey) lasted 52 years.
Source: our estimates.
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Fig. 2. The correlation between episode magnitude – partial regression to the mean (PRM) – and growth magnitude—No Change.
Source: our estimates.
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Fig. 3. The correlation between episode magnitude (PRM) and episode magnitude—complete regression to the mean (CRM)/world average.
284 L. Pritchett et al. / Economic Modelling 55 (2016) 279–291gap between say Indonesia and an upper middle income country like
Tunisia. Similarly, growth decelerations lead to some very large losses.
In Figs. 2 and 3, we show the correlations of growthmagnitude—PRM
with growthmagnitude—NoChange (NC), and growthmagnitude—CRM
respectively. The PRM and CRM measures are highly correlated (0.89)
which is not surprising as the strong “regression to the mean” in the
regression estimates of predicted growth implies that PRMas aweighted
average of past growth and the period world average puts more weight
on world average growth. In contrast, there is a weaker correlation be-
tween the PRM and NC measures. In Figs. 4 and 5, we present scatter
plots of growth magnitudes—PRM against growth duration (number ofyears of a growth episode) and the log of level of initial per capita income
at the beginning of the episode. We see a clear positive correlation
between PRM growth magnitude (in absolute terms) and growth
duration (Fig. 4). However, there are also instances of very large growth
magnitudes – both positive (e.g. China in 1977) and negative (e.g. Iran in
1976) –with not a particularly long duration of the growth episode, due
to very large differences between actual growth and PRM growth during
the episode.7 From Fig. 5, we ﬁnd little evidence of large magnitude
Source: our estimates.
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Fig. 4. The correlation between episode magnitude (PRM) and duration of growth episode (in years).
285L. Pritchett et al. / Economic Modelling 55 (2016) 279–291episodes (in either direction) that are correlated with levels of initial per
capita income at the beginning of the episode, though the variance of
these episodes tends to fall with higher levels of initial per capita
income. This suggests that while accelerations and decelerations occur
at all levels of income, themagnitude of these episodes tend to be smaller
as a country gets richer.
3. Decomposing country growth experiences into episodes of
accelerations and decelerations
Our estimates of themagnitude of growth episodes allow a differ-
ent characterization of countries' growth experiences. The averageSource: our estimates.
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Fig. 5. The correlation between episode magnitudegrowth rate is often inadequate as a representation of a country's
growth experience over an extended period. Within a period of 30
to 50 years, countries go through several accelerations and decelera-
tions in growth which lead to large income gains or losses in a rela-
tively short period of time. As Online Appendix A1 makes clear,
most developing countries have gone through at least two growth
episodes with many going through three or more episodes. What
is particularly striking is that “boom and bust” growth is quite prev-
alent in developing countries, with acceleration episodes often
followed by deceleration episodes (and vice versa). We illustrate
this point by the means of three country examples, one each from
Latin America, Asia and Africa.afg
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286 L. Pritchett et al. / Economic Modelling 55 (2016) 279–291First consider Chile, a country which is seen as a growth success and
has had an average growth rate of GDPPC of 2.3 ppa over 1951–2010.
We see from Fig. 6 that Chile has gone through ﬁve growth episodes
with several accelerations and decelerations. Strikingly, in the growth
deceleration episode of 1968–1976, Chile's income per capita was 26%
lower as compared to the PRM counter-factual, followed by a weak
acceleration in 1976–1988 where the income per capita was 3%
higher than the counter-factual. This was followed by a much stronger
acceleration from 1988 to 1997, when the income per capita at the
end of the episode was 58% higher than the counter-factual.
Moving on to our Asian example—Cambodia, we see from Fig. 7 that
there was a calamitous fall in income per capita of 671% in 1970–1982
followed by two large accelerations in 1982–1998 and post-1998, the
ﬁrst adding 71% to Cambodia's income per capita as compared to the
counter-factual and the secondadding42% to incomeper capita. Clearly,
in this case, Cambodia's overall growth rate of 2.3% in 1970–2010 does
not convey much information about the remarkable swings in income
per capita that residents of Cambodia has seen over successive decades.
Finally, turning to our third example, Gabon, we see that the country
has seen quite pronounced “boom and bust” growth (as have many
other Sub-Saharan African countries) with four distinct growth epi-
sodes for the period 1960–2010 (Fig. 8). For example, in 1968–1976,Fig. 6. Growth accelerations anGabon witnessed an increase in GDPPC at the end of the episode of
48% compared to the PRM counter-factual, followed by a large deceler-
ation episode in 1976–1987 when the income per capita fell by 71%
compared to the PRM counter-factual.
The country examples that we have provided in this section make
clear our central point—that focusing on long run average rates of
growth can potentially miss important episode-speciﬁc underlying
causal factors. Our method of estimating the magnitude of growth that
takes into account both the duration of the episode and its growth
rate (as compare to a plausible counter-factual) provides a new way
to characterize the “left hand side” variable in the empirics of growth
that is arguably more consistent with the stylized facts of economic
growth.
4. Cumulative estimates of episode magnitudes
The episode magnitude measure is a ﬂowmeasure of the incremen-
tal output at the year of the end of the episode versus the counter-
factual. Most economic calculations of the returns to speciﬁc programs
or policy changes or investments use stock measures like the NPV of
the “with” versus “without” scenario. In this section, we calculate
the NPV of the incremental ﬂow of value added “with” and “without”d decelerations for Chile.
Fig. 7. Growth accelerations and decelerations for Cambodia.
287L. Pritchett et al. / Economic Modelling 55 (2016) 279–291the episode. These calculations linearly extrapolate the episode GDP per
capita at the episode growth rate versus the counter-factual growth rate
and add up the discounted difference in GDP from the start to the end of
the episode. These calculations allow us to compare the cumulative
change in output that occurs in different episodes, so providing a quan-
titative assessment of the total gains and losses in per capita output as-
sociated with growth accelerations and decelerations respectively.
Table 4 shows the NPV of growth episodes using the PRM counter-
factual for the 20 largest growth episodes, with countries ranked ac-
cording to the absolute size of the episode (in US billions of PPP dollars).
There are 8 growth episodes with more than a trillion dollars in NPV
gain. Obviously a number of these are the world's largest countries
with China's accelerations in 1977 and 1991 on the list plus India's
growth acceleration in 2002. Countries with high levels of output per
person such as Great Britain in 1981 and Australia 1969 also make the
list as total GDP is large. We also provide the total NPV gain per person,
as well as annualized gains (NPV gain per person as a ratio of the
duration of the episode) along with the duration of the episode.8 Both8 One limitation of calculating per capita NPV gain/loss in annualized terms is that it
tends to give higherweight to short and sharp booms/busts than longer duration episodes
which may lead to a larger cumulative change in NPV income, and therefore, living stan-
dards. Some of these sharp accelerations in incomemay simply be recoveries from a crisis
(as in the case of Ireland in 1987) and not comparable to the miracle growth episodes of
China in 1977 and 1991, Indonesia in 1967, Taiwan in 1962 and Korea in 1962.in terms of total NPV gain per person and annualized NPV gains per per-
son, Taiwan's growth acceleration episode of 1962 has the highest gain,
with a total NPV gain per person of 73,593US PPP dollars, and per capita
annualized gain of 2230 US PPP dollars per year.
The rankings in Table 4 are affected by the size of the country's pop-
ulation since absolute gains are a product of total GDP. To adjust for
population and initial income we also rank the twenty largest gains by
the ratio of NPV gain of the episode to initial GDPPC (Table 5). This
brings the smaller East Asian Dragons to the fore. The accelerations
in Taiwan in 1962, Indonesia in 1967, Thailand in 1958, Korea in
1962 and Vietnam in 1989 plus in Egypt in 1976 and China in 1991 all
have NPV/GDPPC over eight times. Interestingly, the growth accelera-
tions of Uganda in 1988 and Mozambique in 1995 make the list of the
top 20.
Tables 6 and 7 show the largest twenty growth episode NPV losses,
again ranked in two ways—the absolute size of the loss (Table 6)
and the ratio of NPV loss to beginning GDP per capita (Table 7). The
NPV of absolute losses is in this case dominated by countries that started
with high incomeper capita and had long-lasting slowdowns (e.g. Japan
in 1991, Greece in 1973, Spain in 1974, Austria in 1979, Switzerland in
1974, and Italy in 1990 and 2001).
The list of NPV loss to initial GDPPC ﬁnds overlap and some new
countries. The growth slowdown in Brazil, a big deceleration (5 percent-
age points) thatwas long (22 years) in a country of uppermiddle income
and large population is high on both lists the magnitude of the loss was
9 See http://www.economist.com/news/ﬁnance-and-economics/21591573-once-
treated-scorn-randomised-control-trials-are-coming-age-random-harvest.
Fig. 8. Growth accelerations and decelerations for Gabon.
288 L. Pritchett et al. / Economic Modelling 55 (2016) 279–2917.5 trillion dollars or 61,353 dollars per person for a ratio of loss to GDPPC
over 8 (with an annualized loss of 2789 US PPP dollars per year). The
growth deceleration in Iran that lasted from 1976 to 1988 is particularly
striking as it cost each citizen 146,643 dollars (and 12,220 dollars
annually), a loss 11 times initial GDPPC and over 5 trillion dollars.
Using theNPV loss to beginningGPC per capita ratio also emphasizes
the losses for smaller and poorer countries. The growth decelerations in
the 1970s/early 1980s were costly in Africa (Malawi 1978, Cote d'Ivoire
1978, Somalia 1978, and Madagascar 1974) and Latin America (Brazil
1980, Honduras 1979, and Ecuador 1978). When starting from a low
base, these are particularly tragic. The growth deceleration in Malawi
that began in 1978 cost each person cumulatively almost 10,000 dollars.
These NPV estimates return us to the Lucas epigram that starts the
paper. Suppose there was some policy action denoted by X that could
have been taken that would have avoided the Brazilian deceleration
of 1980. That X (supposing it exists) would have avoided the loss of
7.5 trillion dollars in GDP. Conversely, whatever collection of policy
actions X that caused India's growth to accelerate in 2002 produced
(as of 2010) an additional 2.5 trillion dollars in output. This requires
policy makers think about what these Xs might be and how to do
them (economically and politically) as the policy actions appear as
very attractive investments according to our estimates.To stress the importance of our NPV calculations from a policy
point of view, let us provide one example of the NPV from a different
context. A recent paper from JPAL afﬁliated authors examined a type
of poverty intervention for the poor using randomized methods in
six different countries (Banerjee et al., 2015. This study has attracted
a fair amount of media attention.9 In the JPAL press release (http://
www.povertyactionlab.org/node/11547), the case of India was cited
as particularly successful at reaching the extreme poor at 1.25 dollars
a day and increasing their consumption sustainably by 26%. Suppose
that all of these gains persisted in perpetuity. Then the NPV gross gain
(not net) for a person just at the poverty line at a 5% discount rate
is 2372dollars = (1.25 * 365 * 0.26) / 0.05. Suppose we make a very
optimistic assumption that this program could be effectively replicated
to reach 100million poor people (the press release notes it has reached
30,000 so far). The gross gains (we are ignoring costs) from that stupen-
dously effective program would be 237 billion dollars. This is still about
1000 times smaller than the NPV of the gains from the growth acceler-
ation in India in 2002. This clearly shows the “staggering” impact of
growth acceleration.
Table 4
Largest growth episode gains in NPV (using PRM magnitude), ranked by absolute dollar size.
Source: our estimates.
Country Year Size
(billions of PPP$)
Ratio NPV gain
to initial GDPPC
NPV gain per person
(US$ PPP)
Duration of
episode (years)
NPV gain per person per year
(US$ PPP)
China 1991 11,786.52 8.14 10,129.3 19 533.12
Japan 1970 2815.56 1.96 26,983.2 21 1284.91
China 1977 2655.71 6.36 2807.0 14 200.50
India 2002 2523.38 1.19 2425.7 8 303.21
Great Britain 1981 2498.77 2.67 44,318.2 21 2110.39
Indonesia 1967 1119.03 15.05 9711.9 29 334.89
India 1993 1097.62 0.86 1237.8 9 137.53
Poland 1991 1048.22 3.68 27,402.1 19 1442.22
Iran 1988 881.76 3.15 16,275.1 22 739.78
Taiwan 1962 877.15 36.67 73,593.2 32 2299.79
Brazil 1967 631.80 2.27 7175.5 13 551.96
Turkey 1958 630.97 6.80 23,805.0 52 457.79
Vietnam 1989 455.44 8.17 6914.4 21 329.26
Pakistan 1970 441.11 6.80 6535.8 40 163.40
Australia 1969 425.93 1.69 34,406.8 41 839.19
Korea 1962 421.17 9.53 15,941.3 20 797.07
Romania 1994 408.57 3.43 17,972.7 16 1123.29
Japan 1959 371.56 0.80 3982.6 11 362.05
Egypt 1976 332.25 8.15 8804.2 16 550.26
Nigeria 1987 323.54 3.71 3618.8 23 157.33
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In this paper,we estimate themagnitude of countries' growth acceler-
ations and decelerations, which we call the episode magnitude. We pro-
pose a ﬂow and stock measure of the episode magnitude. The ﬂow
measure of a particular episode is the difference between the actual
level of output at the end of the episode and the counter-factual level
of output that would have been produced in the absence of this particu-
lar episode. The stock measure computes the total net present value of
the difference between the actual trajectory of output during the episode
and the predicted trajectory. To calculate the “counter-factual” growth
rate, we ﬁrst use two options: (a) the country's growth rate in its previ-
ous episode, and (b) the world average or complete regression to the
mean growth rate. We argue that neither option is satisfactory, and pro-
pose an alternatemethod of calculating counter-factual growth: a partial
regression to the mean growth rate, which uses a regression for each
country/episode to allow “predicted” growth to depend on a country's
initial GDP per capita, the episode period speciﬁc world average growthTable 5
Largest growth episode gains in NPV (using PRM magnitude), ranked by NPV gain to beginnin
Source: our estimates.
Country Year Ratio NPV gain to
beginning GDPPC
Size
(billions of PPP$)
Taiwan 1962 36.67 877.15
Indonesia 1967 15.05 1119.03
Thailand 1958 14.73 309.17
Korea 1962 9.53 421.17
Vietnam 1989 8.17 455.44
Egypt 1976 8.15 332.25
China 1991 8.14 11,786.52
Laos 1979 7.02 14.56
Turkey 1958 6.80 630.97
Pakistan 1970 6.80 441.11
China 1977 6.36 2655.71
Panama 1959 6.33 12.71
Cambodia 1982 5.92 21.76
Uganda 1988 5.36 45.85
Ireland 1987 5.12 273.88
Singapore 1968 4.98 59.04
Lesotho 1986 4.97 5.38
Mozambique 1995 4.68 24.25
Albania 1992 4.64 32.45
Nepal 1983 4.58 42.84and a ﬂexibly speciﬁed regression to the mean. Using this method, we
place dollar ﬁgures on growth episodes. The top 20 growth accelerations
have a NPV magnitude of 30 trillion dollars—twice US GDP. The top 20
growth decelerations account for 35 trillion dollars less in NPV of output.
To paraphrase Lucas (1988), “What, exactly” can countries do to ini-
tiate an episode of sustained (and not subsequently reversed) growth?
“What, exactly” can countries do to avoid a period of sustained stagna-
tion? “What, exactly” can countries do to avoid a depression? We have
obviously not answered any of these questions in this paper, much less
“exactly.” But we have attempted to lay an empirical foundation of the
magnitude of growth changes and a classiﬁcation that clariﬁes and pro-
vides a measure of what it is to be explained. The gains in income gains
and losses that we document are too large to be explained by changes
in ‘steady-state’ as in the new growth economics, or by fundamental de-
terminants of long-run per capita income such as institutions, which by
their nature are slow-moving and sticky.What explains such ‘staggering’
gains and losses in income over relatively short periods is the key ques-
tion that future research on economic growth should try and address.g GDP per capita (GDPPC).
NPV gain per person
(US$ PPP)
Duration of
episode (years)
NPV gain per person per year
(US$ PPP)
73,593.2 32 2299.79
9711.9 29 334.89
11,962.2 29 412.49
15,941.3 20 797.07
6914.4 21 329.26
8804.2 16 550.27
10,129.3 19 533.12
4455.5 23 193.72
23,805.0 52 457.79
6535.8 40 163.40
2807.0 14 200.50
11,396.7 23 495.51
2982.1 16 186.38
2834.5 22 128.84
77,368.4 15 5157.90
29,344.2 12 2445.35
3390.6 24 141.28
1526.2 15 101.75
10,562.0 18 586.78
2718.6 27 100.69
Table 7
Largest growth episode losses in NPV (using PRMmagnitude), ranked by NPV loss to beginning GDP per capita (GDPPC).
Source: our estimates.
Country Year Ratio NPV loss to
beginning GDPPC
Size
(billions of PPP$)
NPV loss per person
(US$ PPP)
Duration of
episode (years)
NPV loss per person per year
(US$ PPP)
Malawi 1978 −12.36 −56.50 −9608 24 −400.35
Kenya 1967 −11.48 −135.49 −13294 43 −309.17
Iran 1976 −11.00 −5055.57 −14,6643 12 −12,220.26
Brazil 1980 −8.82 −7547.67 −61353 22 −2788.79
Ivory Coast 1978 −8.71 −121.05 −15218 32 −475.56
Honduras 1979 −8.59 −94.72 −28,886 31 −931.80
Greece 1973 −7.73 −1078.03 −120,733 37 −3263.05
Somalia 1978 −7.57 −30.69 −6559 32 −204.98
Oman 1985 −6.89 −162.17 −108,314 25 −4332.55
Spain 1974 −6.11 −3274.15 −93,057 36 −2584.92
Ecuador 1978 −5.51 −204.00 −27,239 21 −1297.09
Jordan 1965 −5.50 −21.52 −20,275 9 −2252.81
Austria 1979 −5.41 −906.28 −120,046 31 −3872.46
Madagascar 1974 −5.34 −46.13 −6214 28 −221.92
Israel 1975 −5.30 −279.51 −83,330 35 −2380.85
Iraq 1979 −4.89 −348.06 −27,260 12 −2271.64
Panama 1982 −4.74 −54.69 −26,816 20 −1340.78
Switzerland 1989 −4.72 −14.86 −17,497 21 −833.21
Jordan 1982 −4.67 −48.20 −20,533 9 −2281.41
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1989 −4.03 −94.79 −2503 11 −227.53
Table 6
Largest growth episode losses in NPV (using PRMmagnitude), ranked by absolute dollar size.
Source: our estimates.
Country Year Size
(billions of PPP$)
Ratio NPV loss to
initial GDPPC
NPV loss per person
(US$ PPP)
Duration of
episode (years)
NPV loss per person per year
(US$ PPP)
Japan 1991 −9379.01 −2.65 −75,670 19 −3982.63
Brazil 1980 −7547.67 −8.82 −61,353 22 −2788.77
Iran 1976 −5055.57 −11.00 −14,6643 12 −12,220.3
Spain 1974 −3274.15 −6.11 −93,057 36 −2584.92
Greece 1973 −1078.03 −7.73 −120,733 37 −3263.05
Italy 2001 −994.50 −0.59 −17,167 9 −1907.44
Indonesia 1996 −922.53 −1.50 −4587 14 −327.643
Austria 1979 −906.28 −5.41 −120,046 31 −3872.45
Italy 1990 −898.18 −0.64 −15,837 11 −1439.73
Mexico 1981 −749.44 −0.98 −10,711 8 −1338.88
Switzerland 1974 −581.51 −2.84 −90,017 36 −2500.47
Mexico 1989 −521.25 −0.69 −6253 21 −297.762
Korea 1991 −468.41 −0.85 −10,808 11 −982.545
Nigeria 1976 −449.57 −3.58 −6771 11 −615.545
Taiwan 1994 −443.19 −1.20 −21,011 16 −1313.19
Poland 1979 −434.73 −1.33 −12,330 12 −1027.5
Belgium 1974 −405.51 −2.20 −41,515 36 −1153.19
Malaysia 1996 −386.74 −2.04 −18,543 14 −1324.5
Romania 1986 −348.54 −2.04 −15,422 8 −1927.75
Iraq 1979 −348.06 −4.89 −27,260 12 −2271.67
290 L. Pritchett et al. / Economic Modelling 55 (2016) 279–291Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2016.02.020.
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